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With comprehensive immigration reform dead for the foreseeable future,
immigration laws enacted at the subfederal level -- cities, counties, and
states -- have become even more important. Arizona has dominated media
coverage and become the popular representation of the states' response to
immigration by enacting SB 1070 and other notoriously anti-immigrant
laws. Illinois, by contrast, has received relatively little media coverage for
enacting laws that benefit the immigrants within its jurisdiction. The reality
on the ground is that subfederal jurisdictions in the United States have taken
very divergent paths on the issue of immigration regulation.
Compiling city, county, and state immigration laws from 2005-2011, we
created a unique database that enables us to build the Immigrant Climate
Index ("ICI"): a measure of the divergent immigration climates created by
individual jurisdictions. The reasons for this divergence have received
surprisingly little analysis; existing analysis has focused on the presence
and effect of immigrants and the political ideology of the subfederal
jurisdictions.
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Our study demonstrates that there is another important factor to consider.
Instead of looking outward to the foreign immigrants moving into a
jurisdiction, we look inward and study the impact of domestic migrants
(those who moved into a state from another state within the past year).
Using panel regressions incorporating our ICI scores and census data, we
observe that domestic migrants are affecting the immigration climate of
their new home states. Domestic migrants are more likely to be educated
and to be politically active, and thus to carry their immigration preferences
to their new states. Specifically, domestic migrants coming from states
with negative ICI scores have a negative effect on their new states' ICI
scores. Moreover, the influence of domestic migrants is magnified, and
more negative, when they move from states that are predominantly white,
to states with large immigrant populations. Our results support a story of
intergroup conflict, in which domestic migrants react negatively to the
racial, ethnic, and cultural dislocation they experience in their new home
states.
I. INTRODUCTION
Immigration laws enacted at the subfederal level - by cities, counties,
and states -- have become an enduring part of the United States ("U.S.")
legal landscape. Though subfederal immigration laws are still occasionally
the subject of legal challenges, the focus of the national conversation in the
U.S. has largely shifted from whether to have subfederal immigration
regulation, to whatform that regulation should take.
The significance of this shift is best appreciated through a historical lens.
Though state and local governments have always been involved in the
integration of immigrants within their jurisdiction, the phenomenon of
direct immigration regulation at the subfederal level can be traced to the
9/11 attacks. In June 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft invited states
to enforce civil immigration laws as part of "our narrow anti-terrorism
mission."' This invitation created considerable controversy because it
reversed the longstanding federal position that state enforcement of
immigration laws was limited to criminal laws (e.g., human trafficking
laws).2 Using their "inherent authority" as sovereigns, Ashcroft maintained
Attorney General John Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks on the National Security Entry-
Exit Registration System (Jun. 6, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/
speeches/2002/060502agpreparedremarks.htm (last visited March 4, 2015)[hereinafter
"Ashcroft"].
2 See Memorandum Opinion on Assistance by State and Loc. Police in Apprehending
Illegal Aliens, 20 Op. O.L.C. 26, (1996), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/olc/opinions/1996/02/31/op-olc-v020-p0026.pdf (opining that local police may enforce
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that states could also enforce civil immigration laws (e.g., laws prohibiting
visa overstays).3
Civil rights and immigrant groups harshly criticized this invitation,
arguing that immigration law enforcement by state and local police would
have dire policy results, including increased criminal activity as immigrants
would be reluctant to report crimes or to cooperate with criminal
investigations and increased civil rights violations as police without
immigration law training tried to make determinations about who has legal
immigration status.4 These arguments, as well as legal arguments about the
federal government's authority to preempt subfederal immigration
regulation, have been made in many different federal lawsuits, challenging
the legality of both positive and negative immigration laws.
The legal results have been mixed. The local ordinances requiring that
landlords check the immigration status of potential tenants have been
mostly struck down.5 Similarly, state laws that offer in-state tuition to
college students regardless of immigration status have been largely upheld.
6
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld employer sanction provisions in
the Legal Arizona Workers Act, ruling that state suspension of business
licenses for employers who hire unauthorized workers were not preempted
by federal law. A year later, the Court struck down most provisions of
Arizona's SB 1070 but permitted the state to enforce its "show me your
papers" law, which requires state police to check the immigration status of
those they suspect are in the U.S. illegally.8 The differences among these
cases should be emphasized; they involved different laws, different
enacting jurisdictions, and different legal arguments. Yet, the overall
message from the federal courts is similar: some forms of subfederal
immigration regulation are legally permissible, and states, cities, and
counties have to choose carefully from among those forms.
civil but not criminal provisions of the Immigration & Nationality Act).
3 Ashcroft, supra note 1.
4 See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Seeks Disclosure of
"Secret Law" on Local Police Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws (Apr. 14, 2003),
https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-seeks-disclosure-secret-law-local-police-enforcement-
federal-immigration-laws.
5 See, e.g., Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 535-36
(5th Cir. 2013) (holding that the city ordinance requiring tenants to show proof of legal
status was preempted by federal law) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014).
6 See, e.g., Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 241 P.3d 855, 870 (2010)
(holding that California colleges may give in-state tuition rates to students regardless of
immigration status).
7 Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1987 (2011).8 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012).
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Against this backdrop, states, cities, and counties have taken divergent
paths. Some subfederal jurisdictions have been very active in enacting
immigration regulations, while other jurisdictions have largely remained
silent. Initially, cities and counties led the charge with law enforcement
regulations (either requiring or prohibiting their law officers from enforcing
immigration laws). States moved into the regulation picture later; with
authority to regulate in more areas, states have surpassed city and county
activity, enacting immigration laws related to education, public services,
and employment, as well as law enforcement.9 The combined activity of
states, cities, and counties has resulted in an explosion of subfederal
immigration laws.
The jurisdictions that have enacted restrictive laws have received the
lion's share of media attention. For example, Arizona, when it enacted SB
1070, received widespread attention and a reputation as "the state most
aggressively using its own laws to fight illegal immigration."'0 Thus,
Arizona with its highly restrictive laws has become the popular
representation of how subfederal jurisdictions regulate immigrants within
their jurisdictions. In contrast, other subfederal governments have, more
quietly, enacted laws that benefit immigrants within their jurisdictions. For
example, the state of Illinois in 2005 enacted a law allowing unexpired
matricula consular cards (issued by the Mexican government) to be used for
state identification purposes." Additionally, at the local level, cities and
counties have also enacted laws beneficial for immigrants. For example, in
2007 Middlebury, Vermont enacted a law prohibiting its police from asking
about immigration status, seeking out unauthorized workers, or engaging in
racial profiling.12
Because of these divergent paths in immigration regulation, an immigrant
living in one state may have a very different experience than an immigrant
living in a different state. It is this different regulatory experience that we
refer to as "climate." Thus, in order to understand the immigrant
experience in the United States, it is crucial to understand the divergence in
subfederal immigration regulation. To that end, we created the Immigrant
9 This decreased local activity can be explained, in part, by state laws that preempt local
activity in a particular regulatory area. For example, in 2007, California enacted AB 976
that prohibits laws requiring landlords to check the immigration status of potential tenants.
CAL. Cw. CODE § 1940.3 (West 2010).
10 Seattle Times News Service, Ariz. Immigration Law Would Be Among Strictest,
SEATTLE TIMES, (last updated Apr. 15, 2010, 9:29 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-
world/ariz-immigration-law-would-be-among- strictest/.
11 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 230/10 (West 2014).
12 MIDDLEBURY POLICE DEPT., UNDOCUMENTED FOREIGN NATIONALS GENERAL ORDER
2.48 (2007), http://vtmfsp.org/sites/default/files/Middlebury.pdf.
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Climate Index ("ICI"), a unique measure of state-created immigration
climate based on hundreds of state, city, and county laws collected from
multiple sources over a seven-year period (2005-2011), the most active
years of subfederal regulation). 3 By assigning a number, either positive or
negative, to each immigration regulation enacted within a state, the purpose
of the ICI is to express, in quantitative terms, the regulatory climate that
immigrants face, allowing comparisons among states and over multiple
14years.
The ICI scores confirm and quantify the divergent paths that subfederal
governments have taken in immigration regulation. For example, the
difference in ICI score between the most positive state (Illinois) and the
most negative state (Arizona) is an astonishing 519 points. To give context
within the ICI's scale, the 519-point difference is equivalent to Arizona
having almost 130 more of the most restrictive immigration laws than
Illinois has. The other states' scores fall in a continuum between the scores
of Arizona and Illinois.
What accounts for the different paths that cities, counties, and states have
taken on immigration issues? Given that immigration is one of the most
pressing issues that the U.S. faces, this question has received surprisingly
little attention. Media attention has focused on incoming immigrants as the
explanation, suggesting that large flows of unauthorized immigrants cause
states to enact restrictive laws.15 Academic studies, using more limited data
than our study, point to political ideology as the determining factor,
concluding that more politically conservative jurisdictions tend to enact
more restrictive immigration laws.
16
13 In previous work, we introduced the ICI and reported some initial ICI scores based on
data from 2005-2009. Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, Measuring the Climate for
Immigrants: A State-by-State Analysis, in STRANGE NEIGHBORS: THE ROLE OF STATES IN
IMMIGRATION POLICY 21-39 (Carissa Byrne Hessick & Gabriel J. Chin eds., 2014).
14 States' ICI scores over time can also be viewed in an interactive format at
http://business.baylor.edu/vanpham/ICI/.
15 See Trip Gabriel, New Attitude on Immigration Skips an Old Coal Town, N.Y. TIMES,
(MAR. 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/us/politics/lessons-for-republicans-in-
hazleton-pa.html (suggesting that restrictive laws enacted by Hazleton, Pennsylvania are a
reaction to the rapidly growing Hispanic population).
16 Jorge M. Chavez & Doris Marie Provine, Race and the Response of State Legislatures
to Unauthorized Immigrants, 623 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 78, 90 (2009); see S.
Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political in
Immigration Federalism, 44 ARiz. ST. L. J. 1431, 1484 (2013) (concluding that local
political contexts are better predictors of law-based restrictive actions); S. Karthick
Ramakrishnan & Tom Wong, Partisanship, Not Spanish: Explaining Municipal Ordinances
Affecting Undocumented Immigrants, in TAKING LOCAL CONTROL: IMMIGRATION POLICY
ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES 73, 89 (Monica W. Varsanyi ed., 2010) (arguing that
political factors are more important than demographic pressures in explaining restrictionist
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While these explanations provide some insight, our analysis points to a
third factor that provides a more complete explanation. Our results suggest
that domestic migrants (those moving into a state from another state) also
influence the ICI of their new state. Using domestic migration variables,
which we created from the American Community Surveys of the U.S.
Census Bureau, we observe correlations between the climate scores of a
domestic migrant's home state and the state she moves to.
By employing panel regressions, we were able to isolate the effect that
domestic migrants have on their new home states' ICI scores.17
Specifically, we observed that domestic migrants moving from more
restrictive states tend to have a negative influence on their new home states'
climates. The political influence of domestic migrants makes sense in light
of separate studies, which conclude that people with higher levels of
education are both more geographically mobile and more likely to vote.' 8
Furthermore, the negative effect of domestic migrants is magnified when
domestic migrants move from predominantly white states to states with
large immigrant populations.' 9 Our results support a story of intergroup
conflict, in which domestic migrants move from racially homogenous states
to racially diverse states and react negatively to the dislocation they
experience. This negative reaction, we suggest, manifests itself in support
for restrictive immigration laws and politicians who advocate for those
laws.
Our results are significant for several reasons. As an initial matter, the
results present a more dynamic and thus more accurate explanation for
state-created immigration climates. Media attention has focused on looking
outward, to the international migrants who are moving into different states,
suggesting that a state's reaction to international migration depends solely
on the numbers of immigrants moving to its jurisdiction. 20 News articles
suggesting that international immigrants "cause" a reaction in the receiving
states present a static and inaccurate explanation of immigration climates.
Instead, our analysis highlights the importance of looking inward, to the
interaction between a state's international migrants and those already living
there. Our results demonstrate that the nature of this interaction can
change, depending on the composition of the international migrants and the
domestic migrants. If, in studying state-created immigration climates, we
focus exclusively on international migration, we would need to assume that
the domestic population is static. But that assumption is false, as data
responses of local government).
17 See Figure 2 infra at 33.
18 See Section II infra at 30.
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., Gabriel supra note 15.
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shows that large numbers of people migrate within the United States every
21year. We account for the presence of this third group, domestic migrants,
and demonstrate how they affect a state's immigration climate, thus
presenting a more accurate explanation.
Finally, the support in the data for the intergroup conflict explanation
raises important questions for future subfederal immigration regulation. If
domestic migrants affect a state's immigration climate and domestic
migrants are themselves affected by their previous interactions with
international immigrants (or lack thereof), then the future implications for
ICI scores are intriguing. What happens if international immigrants
continue their current pattern of settling in areas beyond the traditional
gateway cities? 22 In the short term, there is likely to be more negative ICI
scores as increased diversification leads to increased intergroup conflict. In
the long term, this migration pattern would expose a broader range of
domestic residents, living in different states and cities, to immigrant
communities. If these domestic migrants have interpersonal interactions
with immigrants in their communities, the contact theory of intergroup
dynamics suggests that their attitudes about immigrants and immigration
will become more positive. 3 When these domestic residents, in turn,
migrate to different states, our findings suggest that they may have a
positive influence on their new home state's immigration climate.
Part I of our article explains how the ICI was constructed, including our
data collection methods and our weighting system for different types of
laws. Part II describes our statistical methods and results, including the
correlations we found between states' ICI scores and the domestic
migration variables we created from Census Bureau data. Part II also
explores the implications of our findings, drawing upon the political science
literature.
2 1 David Ihrke, Reasons for Moving: 2012 to 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jun. 2014),
https://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p20-574.pdf ("Between 2012 and 2013, 35.9 million
people 1 year and over living in the United States moved to a different residence. The
mover rate for this period was 11.7 percent.").
22 Jill H. Wilson & Nicole Prchal Svajlenka, Immigrants Continue to Disperse, with
Fastest Growth in the Suburbs, Brookings Institution Immigration Facts Series 18 (Oct. 29,
2014) http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/ 10/29-immigrants-disperse-suburbs-
wilson-svajlenka.
23 See Hood, infra notes 68-69. Briefly stated, this theory states that an increase in
intergroup contact tends to reduce conflict among different groups.
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II. THE IMMIGRANT CLIMATE INDEX
A. Defining Climate and its Inputs
In conventional usage, the climate of a jurisdiction can be referenced in
different contexts: a politician trying to attract industry may pitch her home
state as having a business-friendly climate,24 or tourist websites may
describe certain cities as having climates that are hospitable to gays and
lesbians, or families with children.25 "Climate" then can refer to concepts
as diverse as laws, public opinion, or structural conditions.26
Here, we use "climate" to refer specifically to the regulatory environment
created by enacted immigration laws. We choose laws to measure climate
for two reasons. First, we are interested in measuring the day-to-day
experience of immigrants living in different states, and enacted laws are a
critical part of that experience. Through legal regulation, immigrants
experience prohibitions, requirements, and benefits that affect their daily
lives. And because the laws in our analysis have a special link to
immigrants, we can differentiate the climate experienced by immigrants
from that experienced by other groups in the jurisdiction.
Second, our definition has the benefit of clarity. Though a law's
enactment does not always guarantee its enforcement, our definition
provides a bright line rule for analysis. Tracking enforcement of these laws
is not workable as different political subdivisions have different ways of
allocating resources and recording government activity. Even if it is not
rigorously enforced, the enactment of a law presents a significant
possibility that it will be enforced at some later point in time; an immigrant
who knows that a law may be enforced would rationally account for the
law's requirements in planning her actions. In that regard, the act of
passing a law affects a jurisdiction's climate for immigrants. For similar
24 See, e.g., Jason Whitely, Texans try to lure Sriracha hot sauce maker from California,
WFAA (May 13, 2014), http://www.wfaa.com/story/news/politics/2014/08/21/14210996/.
25 See, e.g., 12 Best Kid-Friendly Destinations, BUDGET TRAVEL (Jan. 25, 2013, 1:22
PM), http://www.budgettravel.com/feature/family-travel-vacation-ideas- 12-kid-friendly-
destinations, 12765/.
26 Climate, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/climate?s t (last
visited Mar. 1, 2015) (stating that climate is "the prevailing attitudes, standards, or
environmental conditions of a group, period, or place: a climate of political unrest");
Climate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
climate (last visited Mar. 1, 2015) (defining climate as "the prevailing influence or
environmental conditions characterizing a group or period.").
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reasons, we removed laws that were repealed, either by the legislature or by
courts after litigation.2
What qualifies as an immigration law for our purposes? As noted earlier,
the law must have a special link to immigrants. The link to immigration
can be explicit, such as when a law authorizes housing for migrant farm
workers. 8 Sometimes, however, the link is implicit: when the law, without
mentioning immigration in its text, has a special impact on immigrants. For
example, the typical English-only law does not reference immigrants, but
its impact will be felt most strongly among immigrants, who are less likely
than the native-born to be fluent in English. 9
Our data set is broader and narrower than those used by other studies.
Our dataset is broader than other studies because our database includes laws
enacted at all relevant subfederal levels: city, county, and state. Our data
also includes positive laws, as well as restrictive laws, over a longer time
period, which further distinguishes our study from previous studies and
provides a more complete measure of immigration climate. By contrast, the
Chavez and Provine study only analyzed restrictive state-level legislation
enacted during 2005-2006.3o Ramakrishnan and Wong reviewed restrictive
laws enacted at the municipal level. Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram
analyzed restrictive and beneficial laws from 2005-2007, at both the state
and local levels.3'
Our data is also narrower than some collections of these laws. 32 Because
we are interested in measuring climate, we excluded laws that mention
immigrants or immigration but have little or no concrete effect. Examples
include resolutions calling for comprehensive immigration reform or
administrative bills that renamed immigration-related agencies.33  Finally,
we excluded some laws because their net effect would likely be neutral.
27 If the law was stayed during litigation but ultimately upheld, we used date restrictions
to account for any time period during which the law could not be enforced.
28 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 4 20.9075(1)(a) (West 2015).
29 See, e.g., Gadsden, Ala., Res. R-336-06 (Aug. 8, 2006) (declaring English to be the
official language of the city of Gadsden).
30 See Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 16.
31 id.
32 For example, the National Conference of State Legislatures includes in its database of
immigration laws all state bills that mention immigration or immigrants, including
resolutions and budgetary allocations. For the reasons stated above, we do not include
resolutions or budget bills in our ICI calculations. See Immigration Enactments Database,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/
immigration-laws-database.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
33 See, e.g., S.R. 5081, 2009 Leg. Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2010); see also Arizona's
Immigration Enforcement Laws, Resolutions, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
immigration/analysis-of-arizonas-immigration-law.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2015).
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For example, anti-human trafficking laws would, upon initial analysis, seem
to deserve positive scores because they protect immigrants from the abuses
of trafficking. But for some immigrants, restrictions on trafficking limit an
important channel for them to reach the United States. One study of
subfederal immigration regulation concluded that trafficking laws help
immigrants, while another study concluded that they hurt immigrants;
3 4
these opposite conclusions reinforce our decision to exclude trafficking
laws from our analysis.
For similar reasons, we exclude laws that provide funding for
immigration-related functions. Budget bills, which are often omnibus in
nature, are very difficult to disentangle; it is often challenging to know
when a particular amount has been allocated for an immigration-related
purpose. Even when that identification is possible, it is difficult to know
whether to classify a budget law as a positive or restrictive law, without
knowing whether the allocated budget is an increase or decrease from the
previous year's allocation. For example, a law that allocates funding for
subfederal immigration enforcement looks like a restrictive law, but if the
allocated amount is actually a substantial decrease from the previous year's
budget, then the law might actually be a beneficial law for immigrants.
Finally, we want to avoid the problem of double counting: if a law is
enacted in one bill and funded in another, we risk double counting if we
count the funding bill as a separate law.
B. Collecting Data
The laws used to build the ICI come from many sources, collected
through a multiple-year process. The state laws were extracted from the
National Conference of State Legislatures, a clearinghouse for state laws.35
The NCSL collects all state laws related to immigration, including
resolutions and administrative laws only tangentially related to
34 See The Anti-Immigrant Movement that Failed: Positive Integration Policies by State
Governments Still Far Outweigh Punitive Policies Aimed at New Immigrants, PROGRESSIVE
STATES NETWORK, (2008), http://www.progressivestates.org/files/reports/
immigrationSept08.pdf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20091029042941 /http://www.progressivestates.org/files/report
s/immigrationSept08.pdf] (concluding that human trafficking laws benefit immigrants and
thus were evidence of a state's integrative policies toward immigrants); Jorge M. Chavez &
Doris Marie Provine, Race and the Response of State Legislatures to Unauthorized
Immigrants, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 78, 84 (2009) (characterizing human
trafficking laws as restrictionist legislation because they increase penalties for those who
assist unauthorized immigrants).
35 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org (last visited
Oct. 30, 2015).
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immigration. As noted previously, we are interested in a law's practical
effect on the state's climate; thus, our ICI uses a smaller subset of state laws
than is reflected in the NCSL's reports.
Collecting city and county laws was more complicated because there is
no central clearinghouse for this type of local legislation. We started with
lists of local laws compiled by advocacy organizations like the American
Civil Liberties Union and the Federation for American Immigration
Reform.36  We combined these lists with information from federal
government websites naming local jurisdictions that have agreed to enforce
federal immigration laws (through 287(g) agreements). We also did our
own searches of electronic news databases to find local immigration laws.
For each law that we found through these methods, we contacted the local
governmental entity to confirm that the law had been enacted, the date of
enactment, and the substance of the laws. Wherever possible, we obtained
a copy of the enacted laws. If our research indicated that the law was
rescinded (because of litigation or other reasons), we noted the year of
rescission in our database and adjusted our ICI calculations accordingly.
The ICI contains laws that were enacted from 2005-2011. We chose
2005 as the start date for our data collection because that is when subfederal
immigration regulation started in earnest. The NCSL only started
compiling reports on immigration-related laws in 2005; before that year,
state laws related to immigration were few in number and largely limited to
the state distribution of social service benefits.3 Our own tracking of city
and county level laws confirms a similar timeline for the growth of local
immigration laws.
C. Constructing the ICI
Because laws will vary in their effect on immigrants, it is not an accurate
reflection of climate to simply count the laws enacted in states. Rather, our
ICI considers both a law's type and its geographic reach when calculating a
36 We also used lists from these advocacy organizations: the Mexican American Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Latino Justice PRLDEF, the National Day Laborer Organizing
Network, and the Ohio Jobs and Justice PAC. MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGAL DEFENSE AND
EDUCATION FUND, http://www.maldef.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2015); LATINO JUSTICE
PRLDEF, http://latinojustice.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2015); NATIONAL DAY LABORER
ORGANIZING NETWORK, http://www.ndlon.org/en/ (Oct. 30, 2015); OHIO JOBS AND JUSTICE
PAC, http://www.ojjpac.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
37 Most of these pre-2005 state laws were reacting to federal welfare reform, the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which prohibited the distribution of
welfare benefits to most immigrants. E-mail from Ann Morse, Program Dir., Immigrant
Policy Project, Nat'l Conference of State Legislature, to Huyen Pham, Professor of Law,
Texas A&M Univ. Sch. of Law (Aug. 12, 2009, 11:47 EST) (on file with author).
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jurisdiction's climate score. Regarding type, which laws have more
impact? Abraham Maslow's influential hierarchy of needs model posits
that humans are motivated to fulfill basic needs first (physiological needs
like food and shelter, and safety needs like security, and freedom from fear)
before being capable of fulfilling growth needs (like relationships, esteem,
and self-actualization).38 Research applying Maslow's influential hierarchy
to immigrants concludes that immigrants are pushed by the disruption in
their life patterns to focus on their basic needs, regardless of the personality
development level they reached before immigrating.3 9
Incorporating that research, we considered which types of subfederal
laws would have the most impact on immigrants' basic needs. Though
there are no laws guaranteeing or prohibiting immigrant access to
physiological needs like food or shelter, there are a multitude of laws that
expand or restrict subfederal enforcement of immigration laws. Subfederal
laws can address direct subfederal enforcement (e.g., 287(g) agreements
where local and state police are trained by federal authorities to carry out
certain immigration law enforcement tasks) or indirect enforcement (e.g.,
laws prohibiting participation in the federal Secure Communities program,
where local police officers share information about arrestees with federal
immigration officials and hold those arrestees for federal pickup and
deportation). These laws can have a dramatic effect on immigrants'
lives. Subfederal participation in the Secure Communities program alone
accounts for a majority of the deportations under the Obama
administration. 40  Through these subfederal efforts, an ordinary encounter
with local law enforcement, say for a traffic violation, could lead to
detention and removal from the United States. Immigrants come to the
United States for various reasons -- economic opportunity, family
reunification, and political freedom -- but none of that is possible if they are
detained or deported. Because deportation (or the fear of deportation) is at
the core of an immigrant's safety concerns, we assigned the highest points
(either four positive or negative points) to these types of laws.4'
38 Seymore Adler, Maslow's Need Hierarchy and the Adjustment of Immigrants, 11
INT'L MIGRATION REV. 444 (1977).
39 Id.
40 Julia Preston, Republicans Resist Obama's Move to Dismantle Apparatus of
Deportation, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/01/16/us/secure-communities-immigration-program-battle.html?hp&action
click&pgtype Homepage&module-photo-spot-region&region top-news&WT.nav top-
news ("Secure Communities, which connected local and state police departments across the
country with federal immigration enforcement.., generate the majority of the 2.3 million
deportations under the Obama administration.").
41 We also include in Tier 4 laws that change a person's treatment within the law
enforcement system based on immigration status (e.g., H.B. 2787, 4 8 th Leg. (Ariz. 2007)
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After laws affecting physical security, our next tier includes laws that
also affect a basic need in immigrants' lives, a need that is very difficult to
replace or avoid. For example, laws that impose local or state penalties on
employers who hire these workers make it more difficult for immigrants to
find any job of work. Immigrants without work authorization may still be
able to find work (by using false identification papers or by working off the
books), but these alternatives come with their own problems and high costs.
For similar reasons, we include in Tier 3 laws restricting or enhancing
access to government identification cards (like driver's licenses) and private
housing.4 2 In our ICI calculations, these laws are assigned three points
(either positive or negative).
Tier 2 laws affect an important but not crucial aspect of immigrants'
lives; in many instances, immigrants whose access is restricted under these
laws can find alternatives with fewer problems or cost than with Tier 3
restrictions. This tier includes laws that affect an immigrant's access to a
specific type of job (like working as an insurance agent or in other jobs
requiring licenses); an immigrant who wants to work in one of these
licensed jobs clearly faces obstacles, but because there are alternative jobs
not affected by these laws, the law's impact is more limited. Similarly,
laws that expand or limit immigrant access to government-funded benefits
like healthcare or college tuition are obviously important to immigrants, but
because there are alternatives, these laws belong in Tier 2 and are assigned
two positive or negative points.
Tier 1 laws, worth one point each, are included in our ICI calculations
because they affect immigrants' lives but in a less important or less
significant way. For example, laws requiring that all government
transactions be conducted only in English have a negative impact on
immigrants, but because linguistic concerns aren't as important as jobs,
housing, and other matters regulated by laws in Tiers 2, 3, and 4, these
English-only laws are assigned one negative point. For similar reasons,
laws making it easier or harder for immigrants to vote and laws restricting
or expanding access to legal services are also categorized as Tier 1 laws.
(denying bail to those without lawful immigration status)).
42 A handful of jurisdictions have enacted laws that require tenants to prove legal
immigration status before they are allowed to rent housing. Most of these laws have been
successfully challenged in litigation and thus are not included in our ICI calculations. See
Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524, 535-36 (5th Cir.
2013). The few housing laws that are in effect are categorized as Tier 3 laws; though they
would appear to deny access to a basic need (shelter). Immigrants affected by these laws
can still find alternatives (by living with friends or relatives with legal immigration status or
by living in a neighboring jurisdiction). Law enforcement, by contrast, is pervasive and
unavoidable, such that subfederal laws relating to immigration law enforcement have more
impact on immigrants' daily lives.
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We also weighted laws differently, depending on their geographic reach.
State laws were assigned whole points (from 1-4 points depending on their
tier). City and county laws were weighted to represent their more limited
jurisdiction, as compared with state laws. A city or county law may be in
the same tier as a statewide law (e.g., Tier 2), but its impact on the state's
climate will be limited to immigrants who live in that particular city or
county. Accordingly, its score is adjusted to reflect that more limited
impact.
For example, Las Vegas, Nevada has signed a 287(g) with the
Department of Justice, authorizing its police officers to perform specified
immigration enforcement functions.43  The negative four points that the
287(g) agreement would usually receive under the tier system is weighted
to reflect the city's smaller population, as compared with the larger
population of Nevada. The calculation is as follows:
1,951,269 (population of Las Vegas metropolitan area)
2,700,551 (population of Nevada)
x -4 tier points
- -2.89 points
When calculating Nevada's ICI, this 287(g) agreement will contribute a
negative 2.89 points to the state's score. Under this system, the laws of
larger local governments (e.g., the city of Las Vegas) will have a more
significant effect on their states' ICI scores than will the laws of smaller
subfederal governments (e.g., Reno, Nevada).
D. ICI Results and Patterns
Adding up the positive and negative points of individual laws enacted at
the city, county, and state levels, we calculated ICI scores for individual
states. Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of scores; Table A lists
ICI scores by state.44
43 Memorandum of Agreement, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Sept.
8, 2008), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/memorandumsofAgreementUnderstanding/
287goldlasvegasmpd.pdf.
44 Our results in this article reflect cumulative scores for the period 2005-2011; state
scores for individual years within this time period can be found on an interactive map
available at http://business.baylor.edu/vanpham/ICFI.
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Figure 1. Cumulative Immigrant Climate Index.
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Table I Immigrant Climate Inde (ICI) Scores Based on
State and Local Legislation Enated 2005-2011
















































































Table 1. Immigrant Climate Index
Legislation 2005-2011.
Scores Based On State and Local
NoTth Dakota
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There are some broad trends about the scores that are worth noting.
First, a clear majority of states (36) have negative scores. That Arizona
tops the list of negative states is unsurprising, given the slew of highly
restrictive laws it has enacted. What may be surprising is that there is a
143-point difference between Arizona and the next most negative state,
South Carolina (-212). So not only does Arizona have the most negative
immigration climate in the United States, but its climate is substantially
more negative than the climate in other negative states. South Carolina,
Oklahoma, Georgia, and Virginia cluster as the most negative states, after
Arizona.
Second, a sizeable minority (14) states have neutral (net zero) or positive
climate scores. The scores of Illinois and California are vastly more
positive than other states, the result of proactively enacting laws benefiting
immigrants within their jurisdictions. Examples of positive laws include
laws granting immigrants access to benefits (like in-state college tuition
rates), laws granting driver's licenses or state ID cards without regard to
immigration status, and laws restricting local police enforcement of
immigration laws. After Illinois and California, there is over a 100-point
drop to the scores of Connecticut, Washington, and Maryland.
The most striking trend, however, is the broad divergence among state
scores. For example, there is a 519-point difference between the most
negative ICI score (Arizona -355) and the most positive score (Illinois 164)
-- the equivalent of about 130 law enforcement actions over this seven year
period. Other states have ICI scores at all points along the spectrum
between Arizona and Illinois. Given the opportunity, states have chosen to
take very different paths on the issue of immigration regulation. What
accounts for this divergence?
III. EXPLAINING THE DIVERGENCE
In media reports about subfederal immigration regulation, the press has
focused on the inflow of immigrants, suggesting that current residents of
jurisdictions enact restrictive laws as a reaction to that inflow.45 Academic
analyses have also linked the rise of restrictive laws to growing immigrant
populations.46 Empirical studies of this issue, working with smaller data
sets than our study, focus on political ideology. Specifically, these studies
45 See, e.g., Gabriel, supra note 15.
46 Cristina Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106
MICH. L. REv. 567, 594 ("Communities are also jumping on the enforcement bandwagon
because they seek control over their rapidly changing environments.").
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found that Democratic areas were more likely to enact pro-immigrant laws
while Republican areas were more likely to enact restrictive laws.4
While immigrant inflow and political ideology are important to
understanding the divergence in immigration climate, our ICI scores raise
questions about the completeness of their explanatory power. The states
with the highest shares of immigrants during this time period have ICI
scores across the spectrum.48 Similarly, states with the largest populations
of unauthorized immigrants have ICI scores that defy easy categorization.
49
Regarding political ideology, it is possible to discern some pattern in ICI
scores along red-blue political lines. However, ICI scores in Figure 1
suggest examples of diverging scores that aren't easily explained by
political ideology alone. For example, Arizona and Texas are both reliably
conservative states; yet their scores are over 260 points apart (the
equivalent of about 65 Tier 4 laws). Similarly, the ICI scores of Oregon
and Washington differ by 80 points, though both states generally share
liberal politics.
Our analysis points to another significant determinant in understanding
the divergence: the flow of domestic migrants among different states.
Interstate migration is an important phenomenon in the U.S. but has largely
been overlooked by researchers, as well as by policy makers, in analyzing
subfederal immigration laws. Informed by the data, our thesis is that
domestic migrants carry their immigration preferences across states and
influence the climate in destination states.
The first empirical evidence we consider is a scatter plot of the
cumulative ICI score of a state from 2005-2011 and the average ICI scores
of states that sent domestic migrants to the state (Figure 3 below). The
simple correlation between these two variables is positive as represented by
the slope of the line fitted to the data points. This pattern is consistent with
our thesis: domestic migrants coming from positive ICI states have a
positive effect on their new home state's ICI while domestic migrants
coming from negative ICI states have a negative effect. As explained
47 Chavez & Provine, supra note 16, at 83-89; Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra
note 16; Ramakrishnan & Wong, supra note 16, at 88-89.
48 Those states are California (151 ICI score), New York (0), New Jersey (-12), Hawai'i
(-66), and Florida (-84). Jens Manuel Krogstad & Michael Keegan, 15 States with the
Highest Share of Immigrants in Their Population, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 14, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/20 14/05/ 4/ 15-states-with-the-highest-share-of-
immigrants -in-their-population/.
49 Those states are California (151 ICI score), Texas (-94), Florida (-84), New York (0),
New Jersey (-12), and Illinois (164). Jens Manuel Krogstad & Jeffrey S. Passel, 5 Facts
About Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEw RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 18, 2014)
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2 15 /7 /24/ 5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-
u-s/.
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below, the influence of domestic migrants is amplified when domestic
migrants move from predominantly white states, to states with large
Hispanic or Mexican-born populations.
*M& *WA *(T




Average ICI scor of states sending domest migran (a
Figure 2. Domestic Migrants Carry Preferences Across Borders
A. Methodology and Statistical Results
The correlation revealed in Figure 2 is consistent with our thesis:
domestic migrants carry their immigration preferences across borders to
influence the immigration climates in their new home states. As we explain
further in Section II.B, domestic migrants are more likely to have higher
levels of education, which also makes them more politically active.
The correlation, however, may not necessarily be all due to the
relationship proposed in this study. Confounding factors could contribute
to this correlation.50  That is, there may be unrelated factors that
simultaneously affect both domestic migration patterns and ICI scores. For
example, a state's geographical location may affect both its domestic
50 ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 406 (2010) (A confounding
variable is "a variable omitted from a study but that does affect the phenomenon under
investigation thereby potentially leading to a false positive result.").
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migration and its ICI score. Southern states have had the highest rates of
in-migration for the time period in our analysis; their proximity to Mexico
could also affect their residents' views about immigration and immigration
enforcement. Similarly, a state's liberal or conservative political
orientation may affect its domestic migration patterns (people are either
attracted or repelled by the state's political climate); political orientation
may also influence views about immigration laws. If either case is true,
then the correlation we see between domestic migration patterns and ICI
scores would not be due to the direct relationship between the two
variables, but rather is explained by the effect of unrelated third variables
like a state's geographical location or political orientation.
We are able to address this possible endogeneity problem with our panel
data set -- we have ICI and migration scores by state over a number of
years. In our regressions, we can include state dummy variables (also
known as state fixed effects) that can account for differences in ICI scores
due to inherent differences across states that do not change with time.
These state fixed effects catch the effects of confounding factors such as
geographical location or political ideology mentioned above."' After
controlling for these state fixed effects, we are effectively looking at the
correlation of migration and ICI scores for the same state from one year to
the next. As such, we can be more confident that this correlation is coming
from the relationship between migration and ICI.
After using state fixed effects to control for possible confounding factors,
we must also consider an additional source of endogeneity. It is possible
that domestic migrants chose their state of residence because of the
immigrant climate. For example, a person who holds restrictive views is
attracted to the negative climate in Arizona. In that case, we have a reverse
causal relationship -- the ICI scores of states are what is causing the flow of
migrants. However, there is evidence that many domestic migrants choose
51 We estimate the following fixed-effects regressions:
ICIst = a + b * Migrationst + StateFixedEffectss + est.
The left hand side ICIst represents the ICI score of a state (s) in any particular year (t), and
the right hand side represents all the variables that could affect a state's ICI score. We are
interested in the effect of domestic migration on climate scores (represented as b in the
equation above). We include state dummy variables to account for possible confounding
factors that do not change with time over our study period (e.g., a state's proximity to
Mexico or its political orientation). Migrationst are several different migration measures,
StateFixedEffectss are a set of state dummy variables (one for each state to account for
the confounding problem), and est is an error term assumed to be independently, identically
distributed normal.
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to move for economic reasons unrelated to preferences over immigration.5 2
Rodgers and Rodgers find that the wages of domestic migrants increase
after the move by as much as twenty percent.53 Though not conclusive, this
result suggests that where domestic migrants choose to move is determined
by job prospects, not by preference for immigration climate.54
We also test our intergroup conflict thesis: that ICI scores are partly an
outcome of domestic migrants encountering inhabitants in their new states
who look very different from those in their origin states. As an initial
matter, our results show that domestic migrants moving from states with
large populations of whites have a negative influence on the ICI scores of
their new home states.55  Using variables that measure foreign and
perceived foreign populations in receiving states, we also found that an
increase in these populations also has a negative effect on ICI scores.
5 6
When domestic migrants move from states with large white populations to
states with large immigrant populations (or populations that are perceived
to be immigrants), the negative effect of domestic migrants on ICI scores is
amplified. Those results are also included in Table 3. Our statistical results
and more detailed explanations of our methodology are in Appendix A.
B. Influence of Domestic Migrants
Beyond the statistical results, what is the mechanism by which domestic
migrants affect immigration climates? Because our ICI measures climate
through enacted laws, we are interested in how domestic migrants affect the
political process of their new home states. Though domestic migrants are a
small group (less than 0.1% of a state's population), we hypothesize that
they have a political influence beyond their numbers for several reasons.
First, we define a domestic migrant as a person who lived in another state
one year ago, but obviously domestic migrants can continue to affect the
political process beyond that initial first year.57 Second, we hypothesize
that there is a large overlap between the people most likely to move within
the U.S. and those most likely to vote. Specifically, individuals with higher
52 Joan Rodgers & John Rodgers, The Effect of Geographic Mobility on Male Labor-
Force Participants in the United States, 21 J. LABOR RESEARCH 117, 121-26 (Jan. 2000).
53 Id. at 124-126.
54 Id. at 126.
55 See Table 2 infra at 50.
56 Specifically, for each receiving state, we measured the fraction of foreign residents,
residents of Asian or Hispanic origin, residents who recently immigrated from Mexico, and
the growth in Mexican immigration. Those results are included in Table 3.
57 We use the one-year definition because the American Community Survey data for the
years of our study provides information in that format (i.e., the Survey asks respondents
where they lived one year ago).
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levels of education are most likely to move within the United States, and
also most likely to vote.
Our hypothesis is supported by separate studies of domestic migrants and
voting behavior. Studies using census data have concluded that individuals
with higher levels of education are more likely to migrate within the United
States.58 Malamud and Wozniak in their 2010 study observe that another
year of higher education is closely associated with a large increase in the
probability of moving away from one's birth state. Based on this causal
link between education and mobility, they conclude that geographic
mobility is one of the benefits of higher education. Using Current
Population Survey data from 1980 to 2000, Emek Basker also found that
education increases geographic mobility, controlling for age, state of origin,
and year fixed effects.5 9
Just as education substantially increases mobility, it also increases the
likelihood of voting. Why people vote is a question that has long intrigued
social scientists. Studies have focused on different determinants of voting,
but one empirical regularity in many studies is the connection between
education and voter turnout. Numerous studies have concluded that
individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to turn out to
vote. Studying the effect of social-economic status on voting behavior,
Wolfinger and Rosenstone conclude that education has a stronger influence
on voter turnout than income. 60  They find that individuals with higher
levels of education are more likely to vote than individuals with higher
incomes. 61 Using American National Election Studies ("ANES") 62 and
CPS data, Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos found that more highly
educated individuals in the United States have higher rates of voting and
higher rates of participation in other political activity, such as: following
election campaigns, joining a political group, and working on community
issues. 63  This finding of increased political activity is particularly
58 Ofer Malamud & Abigail Wozniak, The Impact of College Education on Geographic
Mobility: Evidence from the Vietnam Generation, 47 J. HUMAN RESOURCES, No. 4, 915-50
(2007).
59 Emek Basker, Education, Job Search, and Migration, (Univ. of Missouri-Columbia,
Working Paper No. 02-16, 2003), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id 371120.
60 RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER & STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? 23-26 (1980).
61 Id.
62 A collaboration between Stanford University and the University of Michigan, ANES
conducts its own voter surveys and makes the data available to social scientists, teachers,
students, journalists, and policy makers. AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTION STUDIES,
http://www.electionstudies.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
63 Kevin Milligan, Enrico Moretti, and Philip Oreopoulos, Does Education Improve
Citizenship? Evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom. 88 J. PUB. ECON.
2016 / STATE-CREATED IMMIGRATION CLIMATES
significant because it shows that domestic migrants can have political
effects beyond just their individual votes. Because they tend to be more
politically active generally, domestic migrants can influence the political
attitudes of their new neighbors.64
As noted above, our results also show that the influence of domestic
migrants on ICI scores is magnified and more negative when domestic
migrants move from a state with a large white population to a state with a
large minority or Hispanic population. Our thesis is that natives' views
about immigration are shaped, in part, by exposure to immigrants and
immigrant communities. Those who live in communities with large
numbers of immigrants (or descendants of immigrants) will have more
positive views about immigration. Conversely, those with limited or no
exposure to immigrants will have negative views, which translates into
political support for restrictive immigration laws.
Our results are consistent with what social scientists have described as
the contact theory of intergroup dynamics. 65 According to this theory, an
increase in intergroup contact tends to reduce conflict among the groups.
66
Applied to the immigration context, the contact theory suggests that racial
and social context do affect immigration attitudes.6  Using ordered logit
and ordered probit methodologies and data from the 1992 American
National Election Study and the 1990 Census, Hood and Morris found that
Anglos living in heavily Hispanic or Asian areas had more positive views
about the potential contributions that these two groups make to society.
68
In a later study, Hood and Morris suggest that the quality of the
interaction that Anglos have with immigrants is important in affecting their
attitudes toward immigration.69 Their study finds that Anglos living in
areas with large numbers of authorized immigrants generally have positive
attitudes, while Anglos living in areas with large unauthorized populations
tend to have more negative attitudes. 70 Because unauthorized immigrants
do not have driver's licenses, work permits, social security numbers, and






68 M.V. Hood & Irwin L. Morris, Amigo o Enemigo? Context, Attitudes, and Anglo
Public Opinion Toward Immigration, 78 Soc. Sci. Q. 309 (1997).
69 M.V. Hood & Irwin L. Morris, Give Us Your Tired, Your Poor... But Make Sure
They Have a Green Card The Effects of Documented and Undocumented Migrant Context
on Anglo Opinion Toward Immigration, 20 POL. BEHAV. 1 (1998).
70 Id. at 7-9.
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community, their interaction with outsiders will necessarily be limited. 7 1
The absence of that interpersonal interaction makes it difficult for
unauthorized immigrants to develop the intergroup relations that are the
foundation of the contact hypothesis. 2
Intergroup interaction and the contact hypothesis provide a useful lens
for analyzing our results. In our analysis, ICI scores may be viewed as a
rough proxy for integration because the subfederal laws regulate access to
many benefits necessary for outside interaction: driver's licenses,
employment, and even physical freedom (through the policing laws). States
with positive ICI scores provide more opportunities for immigrants to
develop the kind of intergroup relations that are crucial to improving
immigration attitudes among Anglos. On the other hand, states with
negative ICI scores limit immigrants' opportunities and interaction by
limiting access to benefits. In doing so, the states arguably make all
immigrants, even those with authorized status, 3 the "other." Without the
opportunity to interact, immigrants in this state cannot develop the
intergroup relations that the contact hypothesis suggests is crucial to
improving Anglo attitudes about immigrants and immigration.
C. Implications
As we consider the impact that domestic migrants have on ICI scores, we
see several new twists to a familiar story. Intergroup conflict that results
when different cultures, races, and ethnicities meet is a phenomenon long
studied by social scientists. With our focus on domestic migrants, we raise
questions about where the relevant borders are and the composition of the
insider/outsider groups. As previously explained, subfederal governments
can create radically different climates for immigrants within their
jurisdiction's borders, so an immigrant's decision to cross one state's
border into another state has significant consequences.
In the immigration context, those who immigrate to the United States
from another country are natural candidates to be considered outsiders, but
what about those who "migrate" from another state? Domestic migrants
often have to adjust to different social norms, different racial and ethnic
71 Id. at 11.
72 Id.
73 Though many of the restrictive laws appear to apply only to unauthorized immigrants,
Hispanics and Asians with authorized status are also often affected. See Orde F. Kittrie,
Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IowA L. REV.
1449, 1486-87 (2006) (arguing that the complexity of immigration law leads untrained
police officers who are required to enforce immigration laws to rely on race and ethnicity as
proxies for immigration status).
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makeups, and different legal regimes. Our data suggests that they may be
outsiders in significant ways, carrying their immigration preferences across
state borders and affecting climate scores in their new home states. That
their influence is amplified and more negative when they move from whiter
states to more racially and ethnically diverse states underscores their status
as outsiders.
Thus as we consider the determinants of climate scores, we should
recognize the importance of looking inward, toward the populations already
present in the United States, as well as looking outward to incoming
immigrant groups. Instead of a linear "more immigrants leads to a negative
immigrant climate" story, our analysis suggests a more dynamic interaction
among three groups: international immigrants, long-term state residents,
and domestic migrants. Adding complexity to this dynamic is the probable
influence of racial and ethnic context, as supported by our data above.
Looking forward, what are the implications for future climate scores?
With the caveat that the influence of domestic migrants is only one small
piece of the ICI puzzle, we see some possible paths emerging from our
analysis. In the short run, as some states grow economically and thus
attract migrants (both domestically and internationally), we can expect to
see continued active, and likely negative, subfederal immigration
regulation. The effect of domestic migrants on the direction of ICI scores
(positive or negative) will depend, of course, on specifics: which states are
"exporting" their residents, which are "importing," and the nature of the
interaction among domestic migrants, international immigrants, and long-
term state residents. But in the short run, increased levels of diversification
are likely to lead to negative regulation resulting from intergroup conflict.
Over the long run, however, we may see domestic migrants having a net
positive effect on subfederal regulation. Domestic migrants who may
initially react negatively when they move to a more diverse state may, over
time, have more interaction with immigrant communities (both recent
immigrants and long-term). The contact hypothesis suggests that this
interpersonal interaction is the foundation for the intergroup relations that
lead to more positive views about immigrants and immigration, which in
turn may translate to more positive ICI scores.
The wildcard in this story, both in the short run and the long run, is the
federal government. Subfederal immigration regulation is often justified as
a necessary state response in the face of federal inaction. If the federal
stalemate on immigration continues, we should expect that states, cities,
and counties will continue to be active in subfederal regulation. If the
subfederal activity reaches a tipping point in the long run (as we suggest
above), the federal government may find enough consensus at the
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subfederal level to move forward with immigration reform at the national
level.
IV. CONCLUSION
Subfederal immigration regulation -- where cities, counties, and states
enact immigration laws affecting immigrants within their jurisdictions --
has become an enduring part of the legal landscape. For immigrants,
subfederal laws are centrally important because subfederal governments
regulate important aspects of their lives: access to driver's licenses,
employment, physical security (through policing laws), and other benefits.
Given a limited green light by the courts, subfederal governments have
embraced immigration regulation, taking very divergent paths. What
explains this divergence?
Using our own database of subfederal laws, we are able to measure the
different climates that subfederal governments have created through
immigration regulation (Immigrant Climate Index scores). Using panel
data techniques, our analysis indicates that domestic migrants (those who
move to a state from another state) carry their immigration preferences
across state lines to affect their new home state's ICI score. Briefly stated,
domestic migrants coming from restrictive states tend to have a negative
effect on their new home states' ICI scores; similarly, domestic migrants
coming from positive states tend to have a positive effect on their new
home states' scores. The effect of domestic migrants is amplified when
they move from predominantly white states to states with large immigrant
populations. These results provide support for a story of intergroup
conflict, between domestic migrants and the diverse immigrant groups they
encounter in their new home states.
As we try to understand immigration climates and their determinants, the
influence of domestic migrants on ICI scores underscores the importance of
looking inward to domestic migration, in addition to looking outward to
international migration. This perspective gives us a more accurate
understanding of the complex dynamics involved in creating immigration
climates.
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APPENDIX A
We created these domestic migration variables from the American
Community Surveys of the U.S. Census Bureau:
" migplacl: the U.S. state or the foreign country where the
respondent lived one year ago
" dommigl: fraction of a state's population that lived in another
state one year ago
" scoremigl: for states receiving domestic migrants, the weighted
average of sending states' ICI scores
" whitemiglfrac: for states receiving domestic migrants, the
weighted average of the white fraction (state's white population
compared with total population) in sending states, using the same
weights as in scoremigI
Table 2 shows results from these regressions.
The positive and statistically significant coefficient on scoremigl
suggests that domestic migrants are importing preferences from their states
of origin. A drop of five points in scoremigl leads to negative contribution
of 4.3 points to the ICI, equivalent to one negative statewide Tier 4 law.
Represented mathematically: scoremiglst = !i)--fICIt where rst is the
number of migrants from state i to state S in year t, Mt is the total number of migrants in
state s in year t and ICIt is the ICI score in state i in year t.










Dependent variable is ICI for a state in a year.
Standard errors in brackets.
Regressions include state dummies.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0115, , p <-- 0.1
Table 2. Immigrant Climate and Domestic Migration 2005-2011.
We also ran regressions to test our intergroup conflict thesis: that ICI
scores are partly an outcome of domestic migrants encountering inhabitants
in their new states who look very different from those in their origin states.
To test this thesis, we created these other variables:
" foreignfrac: the fraction of the state population that lived in
another country one year ago
" asianhispanicfrac: the fraction of the state population with Asian
or Hispanic origin
" mexfrac: the fraction of the state population living in Mexico
one year ago
" mexfracgrowth: the year to year growth rate of mexfrac.
As an initial matter, we note from Table 2 above that domestic migrants
coming from sending states with large populations of whites decrease the
ICI scores of their new home states. Specifically, a two percent increase in
the whitemiglfrac (average share of whites in population of migrants'
sending states) leads to a statistically significant -- 4-point contribution to
the ICI score -- one negative state-wide Tier 4 law. The coefficient on the
dommig1frac variable is positive and statistically significant.
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To test our thesis, we ran this regression:
ICIst = a + b * Migrationt + c * Foreignt + d * Migrationt
* Foreigust + StateFixedEffectss + est
Foreignst is some measure of the foreign born or Mexican population in
state s in year t. We are interested in measuring d, the effect of domestic
migration on ICI scores, across states with different foreign population
sizes.
Our analysis demonstrates that an increase in perceived foreign
populations in a state similarly decreases a state's ICI score.
VARIABLES StateFE StateFE StateFE














Constant 102.770* j67960** 148,675**
[56.714 [46,0141 [62 .681
Observations 306 255 306
R-squared 0 64 0.744 0.652
Dependent variable is ICI for a state in a year.
Regressions for years 2005-2011. Standard errors in brackets
• ** < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Table 3. Immigrant Climate as Outcome of Intergroup Conflict
Table 3 shows results from three regressions with the ICI as the left hand
side variable and the right hand side variable being asianhispanicfrac (the
fraction of the state population of Asian and Hispanic origin), mexfrac (the
fraction of the state population of Mexican origin), and mexfracgrowth (the
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annual growth rate of mexfrac). The regressions include state fixed effects
that control for time-invariant state differences that could be correlated with
both ICI scores and state demographics. The estimates of the coefficients
for asianhispanicfrac and mexfrac are both negative and statistically
significant. Controlling for state fixed effects, a two percent increase in the
fraction of Asians and Hispanics in the population makes ICI more negative
by 7 points -- the equivalent of enacting one negative statewide tier 3 law
and one negative statewide tier 4 law. The presence of Mexican
descendants in the population has a bigger effect on the ICI scores. A two
percent increase in mexfrac makes the ICI more negative by 8.6 points, the
equivalent of more than two negative statewide laws. Faster growth in
mexfrac from year to year does not have a statistically significant effect on
ICI.
What happens when domestic migrants move from states with large
white populations to states with large immigrant populations (or
populations that are perceived to be immigrants?) Under those
circumstances, we find that the effect of domestic migrants on ICI in these
situations is amplified and more negative. Those results are also included
in Table 3.
In the first specification, we include as regressors whitemiglfrac,
mexfrac, and the interaction of the two; in the second, whitemiglfrac,
asianhispanicfrac, and their interaction; and in the third specification,
whitemiglfrac, mexfracgrowth, and their interaction. The results are
similar across the three specifications: point estimates for the coefficients
on whitemigl frac, mexfrac and whitemigl frac, asianhispanicfrac remain
negative as in the previous regressions when the variables were considered
separately. The estimate for the coefficient on mexfracgrowth remains
insignificant. Though not statistically significant, estimates for the
interaction terms are all negative, lending some support for the culture
shock hypothesis for the determination of ICI.
